

DINNER WITH PERSONNEL FROM ASSOCIATED PRESS

ULUNDI. 28 NOVEMBER 1985.

A FEW REMARKS BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER KWAZULU, PRESIDENT OF INKATHA AND CHAIRMAN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK ALLIANCE ON THE OCCASION OF A DINNER IN ULUNDI ON THE 28 NOVEMBER 1985 WITH:

Mr J McGee - Member of the Board, Associated Press
and Mrs McGee and publisher
Mr A Torchia - Bureau Chief, Associated Press
and Mrs Torchia
Mr and Mrs D Poore - from Hawaii

I have been in politics all my life. The great founding father of the ANC, Dr. Pixley ka Isaka Seme, was my uncle. I spent many a long hour on numerous occasions talking about the struggle for liberation with Dr. A.B. Xuma and with Chief Albert Lutuli. I knew people like Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Zami Conco, M.B. Yengwa, Oliver Tambo, J.K. Ngubane and Joe Mathews personally. I was a member of the ANC's Youth League. Dr. Mdlalose, a member of my Cabinet and the National Chairman of Inkatha, was also a member of the ANC Youth League, and was with me at Fort Hare University. Another member of my Cabinet, the Rev. C.J. Mtetwa, was an active member of the ANC in Johannesburg. I and Inkatha's leadership are products of the struggle for liberation. I am fashioned by it and I always try to be mindful in my politics of the wisdom of generations of Black political experience. I am both the product of the struggle for liberation and the product of the very history of our country.

When I sat for many hours at a time, as I did, with Chief Albert Lutuli and when I exchanged thoughts and views with people like Robert Sobukwe, Nelson Mandela and others during the 1950's, we talked about tactics and strategies and about the wisdom of the people which had supported the old ANC for decades. In the 1950's there was a false sense of victory just around the corner. Too many saw the demise of apartheid as imminent and when after the National Party smashed the ANC and the PAC by banning them and jailing their leaders, the euphoria of the 1950's continued into the 1960's. For a full decade Black politics in this country virtually came to a stand-still as people waited looking over their shoulder for the return of the ANC External Mission in a triumphant march across our borders. Only a few of our brothers and sisters established the External Mission of the ANC. Thousands of us who were members of the organisations remained inside to oppose apartheid as we have done all these years.

Long weary year after long weary passed and as the years turned into a decade, Black South Africans started looking around them in the realisation that it is we here in the country on the ground who would have to wage the struggle for liberation. Black South Africa began realising that liberation would not come from across our borders and that victory would not be showered on our heads

like some manna from heaven. The struggle was our struggle and we had to wage that struggle even with our bare hands if necessary. History itself then authored two different Black political strings. Inkatha arose in the early seventies finally to be formed in 1975 as one of the mainstreams of Black politics. Inkatha gathered together the products of the history of the struggle and welded them together in a renewed commitment to the traditional ideals of Black South Africa.

I make these points at the outset because too few journalists perceive the depth of commitment which Black South Africa has to the ideals of the old ANC. Inkatha's massive support reflects that depth of commitment. Black South Africa has always striven for Black inclusion in an existing State and it is today that which is striven for in Black mainstream politics.

The centrality of politics that Inkatha serves, and the depth of commitment that there is for Inkatha's aims and objectives and for its tactics and strategies, is shown every time there is an explosion of Black anger in South Africa. In the 1976/77 explosion of anger, I was told that Inkatha was doomed and that the Government would be brought to its knees by protest politics and by the employment of violence. This did not happen and when Black South Africa sat down to count the costs of pursuing violent protest for so little gain, Inkatha's membership began doubling. The phenomenal growth of Inkatha's membership ever since is largely traceable to Black disillusionment with protest politics which achieves so little at so much cost. We all perceive that there must be protest and that that protest must be vehement and it must be made loudly and clearly, but protest which leads to mob behaviour creates situations which are uncontrollable and in the end must become self-defeating.

Mr. Oliver Tambo himself now states that the objective of the ANC Mission in Exile is to develop what he calls a people's war and to spread violence ever more broadly in South Africa to bring about a situation of chaos and ungovernability. Allied to this stated objective of the ANC Mission in Exile is the objective of bringing the South African economy to its knees. As a Black leader I have had to look very closely at this as a possible viable approach. I reject it for the following reasons.

Firstly, I reject it because violence cannot author the kind of society we need in South Africa. Whether we like it or not, we need a free enterprise system, operating in a democratically structured society. We need achievement-orientated leadership in our economy and we need a national effort to generate the kind of wealth which is needed to create jobs for the jobless and to wipe out the vast backlogs that there are in Black housing, education, welfare and health services. For this we need a national effort which could only be mounted if the politics of bringing about change do so through bringing about national reconciliation between

all race groups. The politics of violence cannot author the national reconciliation we so desperately need.

Secondly, I reject violence because the levels of violence which would be required to topple the South African Government through it, would solicit the kind of counter-violence from the State which would raze all things to the ground. Those committed to the destruction of the economy; to the creation of the kind of chaos in which the country is totally ungovernable, have already adopted a scorched earth policy. If violence now so evident is escalated much beyond its present levels, the State itself will turn to adopting scorched earth policies. The upward spiralling of violence desperately needs to be broken, and you cannot do this through the employment of more violence.

Thirdly, violence as a political weapon in South Africa cannot lead to a short, brutal encounter. Violence in South Africa will be protracted. Neighbouring States will not provide springboards for violence. They are simply not in a position to do so, faced as they are with by far the strongest military force in the whole of Africa. There are no internal areas in South Africa which can be turned into liberated zones and in the absence of external springboards and liberated zones, the logistics of moving men and arms and the problems of efficient communications nationwide, militate against any prospect of a short, brutal duration of violence which would bring about radical change without destroying everything in its wake. In our circumstances, the escalation of violence can only lead to a Beirut-type situation.

Fourthly, I reject the use of violence as a primary means of bringing about change in this country because a revolution is now not yet necessary to do so. It truly can be said that South Africa now yearns for a normalised society. There is a widespread perception among White South Africans that this country has to move towards power-sharing between Black and White. Big business has now accepted that they face a bleak future unless meaningful reform leading to power-sharing takes place. All the country's Chambers of Commerce and Industry are now committed to playing a role in bringing about real change. Academics throughout the country are calling urgently for change. Churchmen throughout the country are calling for change. There is in fact an institutional groundswell developing demanding change. The desperate straits of our economy demand meaningful reform leading to power-sharing. The international community demands it, and whatever difficulties the National Party is experiencing with its right wing, there is now clearly a perception in Government that change must come about.

The time is historically ripe now to turn the complete dependence of White on Black in the economy and the Black dependence on Whites in the economy into political interdependency. Black bargaining power is on the ascendancy and the politics of negotiation are now looming up as a reality.

What we need now to do as Blacks is to persist in the traditional Black tactics and strategies which were first mounted in 1912 by the founders of the ANC.

Every step towards the negotiating table is a step which proves those committed to violence wrong. Every success I achieve in gathering the momentum we need for the politics of negotiation is the success which threatens those who are committed to bringing about radical change in such a way that the free enterprise system is dismantled and the National Party Government is replaced by a Black revolutionary government. It is the centrality of Inkatha's power, and it is its vital role in Black mainstream politics, which has led the ANC Mission in Exile to attack Inkatha and my leadership so vehemently.

I believe that the media in South Africa and abroad plays a vital role in the whole process of bringing about change in this country. It is therefore so tragic that some reporters in this country and some foreign correspondents are so shallow in their portrayal of what is really at stake and what the real forces of change are. Protest politics is spectacular and lends itself to sensational reporting. Self-appointed leaders, vociferous in their politics with no real constituency backing, and celebrity leaders capitalising on the climate of anger, do things which make nice copy. The real grinding behind-the-scenes work which organisations like Inkatha do is not newsworthy and does not lead to the kind of copy which reporters seek. Some correspondents report the South African situation as though what I have said this evening is entirely untrue. They never stop to ask themselves what the necessary conditions are for a successful revolution. I know of no successful revolution in history where the army and police force and important sections of the civil service have not defected to revolutionary forces. There is no prospect of this happening in South Africa. The necessary conditions for a successful revolution simply do not exist and you are left with revolutionary forces facing the full might of the South African army and police force. The brutality with which the South African army and police force could act has not yet been imagined by some journalists. There is no Black township in South Africa which the army and police could not cordon off and starve into submission. They in fact will never have to do this because every township requires that degree of normality which permits the essential flow of workers in and out of the township and the flow of food and water into it. There can in South Africa only be heightened equilibriums of violence. The media should I believe be more analytical than it has been.

I reject apartheid vehemently. I reject the Government's homeland policy. I have refused to be drawn into the Special Cabinet Committee. I have refused to participate in the non-statutory negotiating forum. There can be no real negotiations between Black and White in South Africa until those negotiations are focussed on

the steps we need to take to evolve a power-sharing formula which can be made acceptable to the majority of Blacks and Whites. This is the central purpose of my politics. This is the point to which Inkatha's tactics and strategies are leading Black South Africa. I demand one country, with one citizenship and one government and seek within those demands a federal or other formula in which the compromises that we now need to make, can be made.

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